State of Utah v. John Becker : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. John Becker : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald C. Hughes, Jr.; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Christine F. Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Becker, No. 890437 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2039
1,.' \. ;:\'JUt'<i 1 
r # cp °<9c <K 
/ p T N0 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APEPALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890437-CA 
v. : 
JOHN BECKER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1990), AND 
UNLAWFUL ACTS BY A DIRECTOR, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-
10-706 (1990), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
DONALD C. HUGHES, JR. 
520 26th Streetast 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
Maty T. Neorwn 
C'wk of tt» Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APEPALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaint .1 1 t • Appellee, : Case No. 890437-CA 
v. : 
JOHN BECKER, Category No. 2 
Defends Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1990), AND 
UNLAWFUL ACTS BY A DIRECTOR, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
10-706 (1990), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, 
JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah l-H I I -I 
Attorney for Appellee 
DONALD C. HUGHES, JR. 
520 26th Streetast 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 15 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE NECESSARILY LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE FELONY COMMUNI-
CATIONS FRAUD 19 
POINT III THE ELEMENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND 
UNLAWFUL ACTS BY A DIRECTOR ARE NOT 
"WHOLLY DUPLICATIVE" 24 
POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY; AND, DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED ANY 
ISSUE IN THIS RESPECT 26 
CONCLUSION 28 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979) 26 
In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 25 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 2 
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).. 23 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) 21, 23 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 26 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 25 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) 16 
State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981) 26 
State v. Conrad, 590 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1979) 18 
State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)... 25 
State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986) 25 
State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) 24-25, 27 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1986) 21 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986) 2, 21 
State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438 (Utah 1973) 18 
State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984) 21 
State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986) 21 
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982) 21, 23 
State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989) 28 
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980) 16, 18 
State v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983 (Utah 1972) 18 
State v. John, 770 P.2d 994 (Utah 1989) 25, 27 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 28 
-ii-
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980) 26 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) 2, 16-17 
State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) 21 
State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 435 P.2d 146 
(1969) 25-26 
State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)... 1, 15, 1 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 2 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985) 1, 15 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988) 16, 18-19 
State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1989) 21, 23 
State in Interest of L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1982) 23 
Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 
129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah Ct. App. March 2, 
1990) 2 
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990) 21, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).... 3, 21-22 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1990) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 (1990) 1, 3, 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990) 1, 3, 19 
23, 25 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (Supp. 1989) 1 
Utah R. of Crim. P. 19(c) 23 
Utah R. of Crim. P. 24(a) 15 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) 24 
Utah R. Crim. P. 103(a)(1) 27 
-iii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN BECKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890437-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions for communications 
fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801 (1990), and unlawful acts by a director, officer or 
agent, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-706 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for new trial based on either a claim of newly 
discovered impeachment evidence or of exculpatory evidence being 
improperly withheld? A denial of a motion for new trial is 
reviewed only for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 
929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on 
the second degree subsections of communications fraud as 
necessarily included lesser offenses of first degree 
communications fraud? Being a question of law, this Court must 
review it for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985); Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Utah Ct. App. March 2, 
1990). 
3. Are the elements of the convicted offenses "wholly 
duplicative•• such that defendant is entitled to be convicted of 
only one offense? This is a question of law governed by the 
standard of review stated in paragraph 2, above. 
4. Did the trial court err in its instructions to the 
jury; and, did defendant preserve these issues by excepting to 
the instructions given? Jury instructions are within the 
discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed for 
prejudicial error,, State v. Hansen, 734 P. 2d 421, 428 (Utah 
1986); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-920 (Utah 1987). This 
Court must make original legal determinations regarding waiver 
and prejudice. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes, constitutional provisions 
and rules for a determination of this case are contained in the 
appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant John Becker was originally charged in three 
separate informations with communications fraud, a first degree 
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felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990) 
(Second Judicial District Court Case No. 891919454 R. 1-2), 
unlawful acts by a director, officer or agent, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 (1990) (Second 
Judicial District Court Case No. 891919455 R. 1-2, 9), and theft, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-404 
(1990) (Second Judicial District Court Case No. 891919456 R. 1). 
The cases were consolidated for trial on the basis that the 
charges were part of a single criminal episode (R. 34-35). On 
April 5, 1989, jury trial commenced before the Honorable Stanton 
M. Taylor, Judge, Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, 
State of Utah (R. 50). On April 12, 1989, the jury returned 
verdicts of guilty to the lesser included offense of 
communications fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(e) (1990) (R. 74), guilty of 
unlawful acts by a director as charged (Case 891919455 R. 21), 
and not guilty of theft (Case 891919456 R. 25). On May 15, 1989, 
defendant filed a motion for new trial based on a claim that the 
prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence which constituted 
newly discovered impeachment evidence (R. 154-186). The motion 
was denied on June 5, 1989 (R. 193). Defendant then moved the 
court to consider reduction of the offenses under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990) (R. 144). At the time of sentencing, the 
The district court has forwarded three record volumes numbered 
respectively to each of the three original informations. 
However, for the most part, all pretrial, trial and post-trial 
records are in the main volume, Second Judicial District Court 
Case No. 891919454. Therefore, references to the record will be 
to the main volume unless otherwise specifically noted. 
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court reduced the conviction on communications fraud by one 
degree to a third degree felony, and withheld imposition of 
sentence on the offense of unlawful acts by a director (R. 153; 
Case 891919455 R. 26). On May 22, 1989, defendant was sentenced 
to a single sentence of zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison (R. 153). A determination of restitution was reserved by 
the court (R. 213). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 
8, 1989 (R. 206). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
White Oil Company, Ogden, Utah, was a retail gas 
service company started by Peter White in 1953, and purchased by 
the Callister family in 1964. The Callisters renamed the company 
Mountain Oil (T. 41). Defendant Becker had been employed by 
White Oil and continued as the bookkeeper for Mountain Oil (T. 
45). Mountain Oil consisted of five gasoline service stations 
with convenience stores in the Ogden area. A warehouse, service 
station and the main office, where defendant worked, were located 
at 2520 Pennsylvania Ave., Ogden, Utah (T. 42-44). At the time 
of trial, Mountain Oil was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a direct 
result of this case (T. 42). 
In 1964, Allen and Paul Callister were the officers of 
Mountain Oil, Robert Dalton was the office manager and defendant 
was the bookkeeper and "second in command" (T. 45, 63). In 1969, 
Allen Callister died. Paul Callister became president and 
another brother, Jan Callister, became vice-president (T. 47). 
Dalton was subsequently made a director and given a share of 
stock (T. 47, 515). In 1979, defendant was made a director and 
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given a share of stock (T. 47, 183, 293, 564). 
The Callisters were not involved in the day-to-day 
operation of Mountain Oil. Instead, the company was run by 
Dalton and defendant (T. 60-63, 181). Beginning in the 1980's, 
Dalton was absent much of the time from the office due to alcohol 
and other health problems (T. 359-361). Defendant ran the 
company in his absence (T. 63, 361). Defendant had authority to 
order supplies, disburse payments, issue payroll and all other 
company checks, access the service stations' drop safes, and hire 
and fire employees (T. 63). Defendant's authority was the same 
as Dalton's, with the exception that defendant was not authorized 
to sign for bank loans (T. 60-63, 532, 561). However, 
defendant's primary duties were over the financial aspects of the 
company. He was solely responsible for all bookkeeping at 
Mountain Oil. This included overseeing and maintaining records 
for all monies received from the five stations, the payroll for 
the company, and all accounts receivable and payable (T. 64-65, 
70, 318). He was responsible for payment of all employee 
The characterization of defendant as a director was contested 
at trial. Defendant maintained that he was never a director but 
given the share of stock as a valued employee (T. 684-685). The 
minutes of the December 4, 1979, directors' meeting support 
defendant's claim (T. 208). However, Paul Callister, Jan 
Callister and Robert Dalton, all officers of the company, 
testified that defendant was a director (T. 46-47, 146-149, 183-
84, 564-566). The accountant for the Callister companies 
testified similarly (T. 293). Additionally, the records 
established that defendant paid himself a director's fee of 
$150.00 for all directors' meetings after 1979 (T. 79-81). Other 
evidence to be discussed clearly established defendant as an 
agent of Mountain Oil. For purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
706, the issue of whether defendant was a director, officer or 
agent at the time of his unlawful acts, was submitted to the 
jury. 
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(T. 50-51, 356, 361, 392). They retrieved the monies from the 
locked drop safes of each station. The safes could only be 
accessed by keys maintained in the Mountain Oil office (T. 53, 
63). The money, both cash and checks, were counted by Gamble or 
Hinds at the Pennsylvania Ave. office (T. 54, 346). The 
secretaries checked the amount received from each station with 
the shift reports ("TDA's") from each station (T. 52, 347-350). 
The shift reports listed all sales for gas and convenience items 
sold during a shift. Each station provided two shift reports per 
day (T. 350). The shift reports were maintained in the office 
and, at the end of the week, combined for a weekly report of the 
activities of each station (T. 351). The weekly totals were 
posted by Gamble or Hinds in the sales journal (T. 352). On 
weekends, defendant picked up the station monies and either left 
the sums in the office or brought them in on Monday for balancing 
by the secretaries (T. 666). Once the amounts received and sold 
balanced, the cash and checks were given to defendant to deposit 
in the bank (T. 352-353). 
When defendant received the verified cash and checks 
from the secretaries, he usually brought the items into his 
office and prepared deposit slips for the bank (T. 303, 352-353). 
Neither Dalton nor the secretaries observed what defendant did in 
his office. After defendant completed the deposit slips, the 
cash and checks were held in a cabinet behind the office counter 
until the bank deposits were made later in the day (T. 357). 
Some monies were also held in the office for petty cash. It was 
this latter source from which Dalton took money (T. 536). 
As further checks on the accuracy of the income from,. 
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generate new figures for the statement but used defendant's 
figures, including sales, income, liabilities and bank 
reconciliations, to computer-generate a monthly evaluation of 
Mountain Oil's assets and liabilities (T. 242-243, 265-267), The 
monthly financial report was reviewed at the monthly directors' 
meetings. The reports were a "decision making tool", used to 
determine if Mountain Oil was making a profit, how the company 
compared to other of the Callister holdings and generally what, 
if any, future management decisions needed to be made concerning 
the company based on its financial status (T. 72-73, 441-443). 
The bottom line was to determine the owner's equity in the 
company, equity being assets less liabilities (T. 420), 
Even before 1979, defendant attended some of the 
directors' meetings because of his financial knowledge. After 
1979, the date the Callisters and others testified that defendant 
became a director, defendant attended every monthly directors' 
meeting (T. 48), During all such meetings, defendant was present 
when the financial statements of Mountain Oil were discussed (T. 
71-73). He answered any questions the directors had concerning 
the figures and never represented that the figures were not 
accurate or based, on true information (T. 73, 85-89, 132, 733). 
Specifically, as it relates to defendant's conviction 
of communications fraud, Paul and Jan Callister, Robert Dalton, 
Donald Murphy and defendant attended the October 21, 1986, 
directors' meeting. During the meeting, the financial statement 
of Mountain Oil for August, 1986 was discussed (T. 81-82, 184-
-i n_ 
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The financial statements discussed in the directors' meetings 
were normally for a previous month as there was some lag time 
necessary to gather and prepare the figures. Beginning in 1985 
ai id continuing in 1986, defendant had been taking more time to 
generate the figures given to Murphy (T. 312-315). Despite t.b I s# 
defendant refused all offers of help in preparing the books
 x_. 
106) . 
Mountain Oil hired two accounting firms to review 
defendant's books, and compare the entries to the original sales 
records, deposits, bank statements and other documentation (T. 
403-407, 439-444), From this, it was determined that any 
alterations in the books could only have occurred through 
defendant (T. 423-425, 462, 477-478). While some discrepancies 
occurred at the service station and inventory levels, the only 
significant discrepancies were in the office's recording of 
assets and liabilities; that is, there were significant 
variations in the amounts recorded as having been received from 
the stations as compared to what was actually deposited in the 
bank (T. 415, 468-469). There were checks written in the check 
register which were never issued, and checks issued which were 
never recorded (T. 457, 468-469). There were no actual bank 
reconciliations (balances) done even though represented by 
defendant as having been made (T. 96-98, 410, 414, 711, 727). 
There were taxes represented on the books as having been paid 
which were never paid (T. 418-419). There was no record of a 
$100,000.00 loan received (T. 483). There was no record in the 
books of Dalton's I.O.U.'s or any accounting for the cash taken 
(T. 461). Defendant did not deny any of the alterations and 
discrepancies listed by the accountants; nor did he deny his 
responsibility for the false entries (T. 724-733). 
It was established that in 1985, $186,000.00 in cash 
was received from the service stations which was not deposited in 
the bank; in 1986, $221,000.00 was received in cash from the 
stations which was not deposited. On average, for 1985-1986, 
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regarding earnings and losses, Mountain Oil owed $588/000•00 in 
unpaid taxes (T. 418-419). Most significantly, based on 
defendant's altered books and figures. Mountain Oil appeared in 
October 1986 to be worth $1,000,000.00 to $1,006,000.00. In 
actuality, Mountain Oil was only worth $13,000.00 (T. 421-22). 
Faced with limited financial worth and approximately one million 
dollars of indebtedness, Mountain Oil declared bankruptcy (T. 
113-114). 
Defendant testified on his own behalf, admitting to 
making the alterations and false entries as alleged (T. 724-725). 
He admitted that he never divulged the inaccuracies of his 
figures in any directors' meeting (T. 733). His explanation for 
the missing amounts was that 1) Dalton took money from petty cash 
and 2) defendant, when faced with mistakes in the accounts, did 
not know what to do (T. 694-695, 703, 710-711, 725-726, 731). 
Juxtaposed to defendant's testimony was Robert Dalton's, called 
as a defense witness, who testified that at most he took 
$14,000.00 from the company (T. 539). Further, one of the 
outside accountants had previously testified that the number and 
amount of discrepancies in defendant's figures could not be due 
to general accounting mistakes (T. 477-478). 
There was no evidence presented that defendant had 
directly stolen the $408,000.00 of missing cash. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion for new trial as the evidence in issue 
was merely cumulative impeachment evidence which would not have 
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Here, defendant argues that he should have been granted 
a new trial on two grounds: 1) that the prosecutor withheld 
exculpatory evidence, and 2) that the evidence withheld was newly 
discovered evidence (Br. of App., Pts. I and II). Neither ground 
has merit. 
1. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence 
There is no question that a prosecutor has a due 
process obligation to disclose even unrequested evidence which is 
exculpatory. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988); 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985); State v. Jarrell, 
608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980). Further, even if not exculpatory, 
once a prosecutor voluntarily complies with a specific discovery 
request, he has a continuing duty to disclose pertinent requested 
information. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-917 (Utah 1987). 
Here, defendant claims that the prosecutor violated 
these discovery obligations in failing to reveal that Robert 
Dalton had entered into a civil settlement with the Callisters. 
Defendant asserts not only that he specifically requested this 
information but also that the information was so determinative of 
Dalton's veracity so as to be exculpatory. Defendant's position 
is factually not supportable. 
Defendant did make pretrial discovery requests, but as 
to Robert Dalton, only the following could be reasonably 
construed to have been requested: 
1. Copies of any written or recorded 
statements of defendant or "any 
codefendant" (R. 5, Request 1) and of 
Dalton specifically (R. 47, Request 4); 
- i fi-
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yet did not question either the Callisters or Dalton about them. 
If defendant thought the matter was relevant, he had a duty to 
inquire concerning any agreements between the witnesses apart 
from any agreement with the state. State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d at 
224-225. The matter was certainly not being hidden by anyone. 
Dalton's attorney represented, in open court in Dalton's case, 
that the matter was being negotiated (R. 184-186). But while the 
witnesses had initially agreed to the settlement, that agreement 
still required the approval of the bankruptcy court, which 
approval was not received until approximately May 24, 1989 (R. 
178). Under the facts of this case, the jury had all pertinent 
information from which to fairly evaluate Dalton's credibility or 
bias. 
2. Newly Discovered Evidence, 
Defendant correctly cites Utah case law defining "newly 
discovered" evidence which might justify a new trial. State v. 
Worthen, 765 P.2d at 850-851. But, defendant ignores the fact 
that impeachment evidence, or evidence merely cumulative of the 
trial evidence, cannot normally serve as a basis for a new trial. 
Id. at 851. Accord State v. Conrad, 590 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Utah 
1979); State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438, 450 (Utah 1973); State v. 
Jiron, 492 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1972). To justify the granting of 
a new trial, the questioned evidence must be "sufficiently 
Defendant argues that Dalton was a State's witness because he 
was subpoenaed by the State. Legally, such a conclusion is not 
justified and factually, it is unsupportable. Dalton stated that 
while he agreed to testify if subpoenaed, he was not subpoenaed 
by the State (T. 518). Dalton testified he appeared because the 
defense requested him to appear (T. 515). 
-1 Q_ 
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(d) The loss to Mountain Oil Company 
for August 1986 was $35,832.07 and a total of 
$221,617.71 for the year 1986. 
(e) The financial report for August 
1986, discussed at the October Board Meeting, 
reflected a profit for the month of August 
1986, of $3,402.00, and a profit for 1986 
year-to-date of $54,000.00. 
(f) Defendant Becker admitted on a 
number of occasions to altering the books in 
numerous different ways in order to conceal 
losses of the company and monies that had 
disappared [sic] from the company. These 
methods included; (a) altering payables, (b) 
altering receivables, (c) not including 
significant items that should have been 
included in the financial reports, (d) 
altering bank reconciliations, (e) improperly 
recording deposits, (f) improperly accounting 
for the loans, (g) not recording checks that 
had been issued and paid, (h) recording 
checks that had not been issued and paid, (i) 
altering cash balances, (j) and other 
accounting alterations that the prosecution 
may not be aware of at this time. 
(g) The value of the losses covered by 
the financial statement alterations and the 
bookkeeping alterations total approximately 
$900,000.00. For the years 1985 and 1986, 
the actual cash losses that were concealed by 
defendant's book alterations total 
approximately $400,000.00. 
(h) Any cash taken, losses incurred or 
books altered were all the property of 
Mountain Oil Company. 
(R. 37-38). 
Despite this, defendant claims that it was improper for 
the trial court to instruct the jury on communications fraud as 
second degree felonies under both Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1)(d) and (l)(e). Defendant concedes that subsection (l)(d) 
(second degree felony communications fraud which has as its 
object more than $10,000.00 but less than $100,000.00) is 
-90-
necessarily included as a lesser offense of subsection (l)(f) 
(first degree felony communications fraud which has as its object 
more than $100,000.00), as the two subsections merely differ in 
monetary amounts. But, defendant argues that subsection (l)(e), 
also second degree communications fraud, is a "lateral" offense 
because its object is obtaining something other than monetary 
value (Br. of App. at 18-19). (See Appendix for text of 
statutory provisions.) 
In support of his argument, defendant appropriately 
cites State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1989), but fails to 
include the controlling cases of State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 
(Utah 1983), and State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). 
Instead, defendant mischaracterizes two cases as being applicable 
which have no bearing on the issue, State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221 
(Utah 1986), and State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1986). 
Presumably, defendant meant to cite State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 
421, 427 (Utah 1986) (overruling State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 
(Utah 1983), as it construed lesser offenses of felony-murder 
statute), and State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1984) (if 
criminal conduct is subject to overlapping statutes, the more 
specific statute governs). Further, defendant totally ignores 
the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(c) (1990) which 
defines a lesser included offense as being so "when specifically 
designated by a statute as a lesser included offense." As such, 
defendant's legal predicate for his argument is askew. 
The communications fraud statute is set up no 
differently than the theft statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
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(1990) and Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-412 (1990). What constitutes 
theft is defined by § 76-6-404, but the degree of penalty is 
defined by the object of the theft under § 76-6-412. (See 
Appendix for text of theft provisions). Theft may be a felony or 
misdemeanor depending on the amount of money taken. But, theft 
may also be a second degree felony if the property stolen is a 
firearm or a motor vehicle; or may be a third degree felony, if 
the defendant has two prior misdemeanor theft convictions or if 
the property stolen is a "stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, 
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, 
swine, or poultry". The theft statute does not fit the "Venn 
diagram" defendant proposes (Br. of App. at 19). Yet, it is 
clear that the legislature intended theft to be generally 
inclusive, with the object of the theft only relevant for 
determining the degree of the offense for purposes of punishment. 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) generally describes the 
elements of the crime of communications fraud while subsections 
(l)(a)-(f) describe the punishment based on the goal or purpose 
of the scheme. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the legislative intent to 
make subsections (l)(a) through (l)(e) lesser included offenses 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(f) is not clear, subsection 
(l)(e) still qualifies as a necessarily included offense of 
subsection (l)(f). Here, the same evidence was presented for 
proof of either subsection (l)(e) or subsection (l)(f), the only 
difference being that in the former the jury could convict 
without proof of defendant's intent to gain something of monetary 
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value. Additionally, a theoretical view of the two subsections 
demonstrates that all the elements of (l)(e) are necessarily 
included in the elements of (1) (f), for the elements of the 
crimes are identical. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 154-155. 
Accord State v. Young, 780 P.2d at 1239-1240; State in Interest 
of L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1982). 
As stated in State v. Howell, 649 P.2d at 95, a trial 
court may give a lesser included instruction, even over a 
defendant's objection, if warranted by the evidence and the 
defendant is not prejudiced by lack of notice or preparation so 
as to deny due process. Here, the State's response to the bill 
of particulars gave defendant full and fair notice of the basis 
of the State's case. 
The state never alleged that defendant directly stole 
7 
the missing $408,000.00. Instead, the theory of the case was 
that defendant, over a period of some five to six years, devised 
Defendant maintains that the lesser included instructions were 
given over his objection (Br. of App. at 17). What the record 
shows is that the trial court, sua sponte, noted it was sure 
defendant did not want the lesser included but that the court 
felt the evidence justified it (T. 799). However, rule 19(c), 
Utah Rules Criminal Procedure, requires a specific objection to 
an instruction to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Ayala, 
762 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Defendant did not do 
so here. It is clear that the lesser included instructions were 
not requested by defendant, but given at the request of the 
State. 
7 
Conviction of communications fraud does not require proof of a 
theft, as evidenced by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(4): 
An intent on the part of the perpetrator of 
any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of property, 
money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
element of the offense. 
a method of altering the books of Mountain Oil so as to cover up 
significant shortages. Defendant alternatively described his 
actions as being done to cover up a $200,000.00 mistake for which 
he could not account (T. 725), and to cover up Dalton's thefts 
(T. 92-93, 583). The State presented evidence that the missing 
monies were not accountable for by Dalton's thefts or general 
bookkeeping errors (T. 457-458, 477-478). Defendant's trial 
defense was that he had done the acts but that 1) he did not 
personally steal any monies, and 2) he was not an officer or 
director of the company for purposes of his other conviction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 (T. 685, 710-712, 725-731). 
Thus, defendant's defense was not affected by the giving of the 
lesser included instructions. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 
464 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
POINT III 
THE ELEMENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND 
UNLAWFUL ACTS BY A DIRECTOR ARE NOT "WHOLLY 
DUPLICATIVE". 
Defendant argues that the elements of the offense of 
communications fraud are identical to those of the offense of 
unlawful acts by a director such that he should have only been 
convicted of one offense (Br. of App. at 23). There are several 
defects in defendant's position. 
First, defendant never made this argument in the court 
below nor objected to the giving of Jury Instructions 11 and 16 
now complained of on appeal. (See T. 781-800 for in-chambers 
discussion of jury instructions; T. 488-493 for Motion to Dismiss 
on other grounds). As such, he is now precluded from raising the 
n A _ 
issue on appeal. State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 463; In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1289, 
1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Second, the trial court did in fact only sentence 
defendant for one offense, apparently on the basis that both 
offenses were part of a single criminal episode (Sentencing 
Transcript at 7-8). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1). While the 
trial court was not required to do so, defendant received what he 
is now seeking from this Court, a single sentence on a third 
degree felony. 
Even if defendant's argument is considered 
substantively, it fails. State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 435 
P.2d 146 (1969), restricts the authority of the prosecutor to 
charge two duplicative crimes. But, consistently the Utah 
appellate courts have limited Shondel's application to criminal 
conduct punishable under two different statutes containing 
exactly the same elements, i.e., "wholly duplicative" elements. 
State v. Gomez# 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986); State v. Bryan, 
709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Here, it is obvious that Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-10-706, governing unlawful acts by a director, requires 
defendant to be a director, officer or agent of the corporation 
and Jury Instruction 16 so instructed (R. 110). On the other 
hand, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, communications fraud, does not 
require defendant to be in any special relationship to the 
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corporation (R. 104, Jury Instruction 11). 
Therefore, State v. Shondel is inapplicable because 
the elements of the two statutes in question are not "wholly 
duplicative". Accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 
(sexual abuse of a child is not duplicative of sexual 
exploitation of a child); State v. Clark, 632 P. 2d 841 (Utah 
1981) (theft of livestock is merely more specific and therefore 
separate crime from theft); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 
(Utah 1980) (theft by deception and deceptive business practices 
are distinct crimes); Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979) 
(presenting a false prescription is not duplicative of forgery). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY; 
AND, DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED ANY ISSUE IN 
THIS RESPECT. 
Points Five, Six and Seven of defendant's brief 
challenge the jury instructions given by the trial court on the 
grounds that 1) the trial court did not properly instruct the 
jury on the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706, unlawful acts 
by a director, and did not properly instruct the jury on the 
definitions of the terms used in the elements, 2) the trial court 
did not properly instruct the jury on the term "on or about" as 
used in reference to the dates of offenses, and 3) the trial 
court failed to include defendant's instruction on reasonable 
doubt. As to defendant's first two arguments challenging Jury 
Q 
The State submits that there are other significant differences 
in the elements of the two crimes, but that a complete discussion 
of all the differences is unnecessary, in light of the 
distinctive requirement of being a director, officer or agent 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706. 
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Instructions 9-11, 16, and 17, defendant raised no objections to 
these instructions (T. 781, 785, 789, 796)- Therefore, defendant 
has waived these issues. State v. John, 770 P.2d at 995; State 
v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 463; Utah R. Crim. P. 103(a)(1). 
As to the reasonable doubt instruction, defendant 
requested an elements instruction containing the following 
language: 
The State Has The Obligation To Prove Each 
And Every Individual Element, Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt. 
(R. 67). Defendant's proposed instructions did not otherwise 
specifically define reasonable doubt (R. 67-71). During the in-
chambers discussion on the jury instructions, defendant referred 
to his elements request and the court responded that it was 
instructing the jury that the elements must be found "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" which the court viewed as "essentially the same 
thing" (T. 800). 
Defendant never proposed a reasonable doubt instruction 
or objected to the reasonable doubt instruction given. Indeed, 
when defense counsel attempted to subsequently assert that he 
had, the trial court stated: 
[T]here was no objection raised to the 
instruction that was given by the Court. You 
have to object. It's not enough to submit 
another one. You have to give me some notice 
on instructions. It's not enough to submit 
something different and then raise no 
objection to the one that's given. 
. . . 
I don't think you preserved your appeal on 
that issue. 
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(Defendant's Motions Transcript at 17). 
Even if this Court were to disregard defendant's 
waiver, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in 
instructing as it did. The instruction given is virtually that 
of the two instructions given in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 
1145-1146 (Utah 1989). Unlike Johnson, defendant never proposed 
any different instruction to the court. Nor does defendant even 
now complain of the instruction for the reasons addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in reviewing similar instructions. (See Br. 
of App. at 31). Under the facts of this case, defendant has made 
no showing that the result of the trial would have been different 
absent the use of the court's instruction. Any error is 
harmless. 3jd- a t 1146. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for 
communications fraud and unlawful acts by a director, officer or 
agent should be upheld and his sentence on communications fraud 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /&A day of May, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
It is important to note that defendant only raised this issue 
on June 5, 1989 after the Utah Supreme Court decisions of State 
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), and State v. Johnson, 774 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), had been handed down in May, 1989. The 
trial court did not have the benefit of these decisions during 
trial in April. However, the trial court, in making these 
comments to counsel, noted his awareness of the changed views on 
reasonable doubt instructions (Motions Transcript at 17). 
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APPENDIX 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1801 (1990). 
Communications frauds 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme 
or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of 
value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty 
of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the 
value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is 
$100.00 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the 
value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more 
than $100 but does not exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the 
value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more 
than $1,000 but does not exceed $10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value 
of the property, money, or thing obtained 
or sought to be obtained is more than 
$10,000 but does not exceed $100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the 
object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of 
something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the 
value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is 
$100,000 or more. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any 
offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, 
money, or things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice described 
in Subsection (1) except as provided in 
Subsection (1)(e). 
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(3) Reliance on the part of any person is 
not a necessary element of the offense 
described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the party of the 
perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any 
person of property, money, or thing of value 
is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for 
the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection 
(1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6) To communicate as described in 
Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit 
information. Means of communication include, 
but are not limited to, use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, 
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written 
communication. 
(7) It is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution under this section that the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted by the 
defendant were not made or omitted knowingly 
or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 (1990). Unlawful 
acts by director, officer or agents 
Every director, officer, or agent of any 
corporation or association who knowingly 
receives or possesses himself of any property 
of such corporation or association, otherwise 
than in payment of a just demand, and who, 
with intent to defraud, omits to make, or to 
cause or direct to be made, a full and true 
entry thereof in the books or accounts of the 
corporation or association; and every 
director, officer, agent, or member of any 
corporation or association who embezzles, 
abstracts, or willfully misapplies any of the 
money, funds, or credits of the corporation 
or association; or who, without authority 
from the directors, issues or puts in 
circulation any of the notes of the 
corporation or associations; or who, without 
the authority, issues or puts forth any 
certificate of deposit, draws any order or 
bill of exchange, makes any acceptance, 
assigns any note, bond, draft, bill of 
exchange, mortgage, judgment, or decree; or 
who makes any false entry in any book, 
report, or statement of the corporation or 
association; or who issues any fraudulent, 
fictitious, or illegal stock in any such 
corporation or association, with intent in 
either case to injure or defraud the 
corporation or association, or any other 
company, body politic, or corporate, or any 
individual person, or to deceive any officer 
of the corporation or association, or any 
agent appointed to examine the affairs of any 
such corporation or association; and every 
person who, with like intent, aids or abets 
any officer, clerk, or agent in any violation 
of this section is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1990). Separate 
offenses agrising out of single criminal 
episode - Included offensest 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under 
any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
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(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged 
or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. Discovery: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information 
of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded 
statements of the defendant or 
codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the 
defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or codefendant; 
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(4) evidence known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilty of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
(b) the prosecutor shall make all 
disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30. Errors and Defects: 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. 
Utah R. Evid. 103. Rulings on Evidences 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling 
is one excluding evidence, the substance of 
the evidence was made known to the court by 
offer or was apparent from the context within 
which questions were asked. 
